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WHOSE ALIEN NATION?: TWO MODELS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW 
Hiroshi Motomura* 
ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA'S IMMIGRATION 
DISASTER. By Peter Brimelow. New York: Random House. 1995. 
Pp. xix, 327. $24. 
I. RACE AND IMMIGRATION: THE PROBLEM ACCORDING 
TO BRIMELOW 
Who is an "American," and how do we choose new Americans? 
Immigration law and policy try to answer these· questions, and so it 
is no wonder the immigration debate attracts so much public atten-
tion. After all, it represents our public attempt to define ourselves 
as a community, and to decide what we ask of those who want to 
join our ranks. 
The stream of immigrants to the United States continues un-
abated. Many come here legally; others come any way they can. 
This seeiningly inexorable trend highlights a complex national am-
bivalence about our past, present, and future. We share a deeply 
rooted tradition of being a "nation of immigrants" - the America 
of Emma Lazarus's Golden Door,1 of the poor and huddled masses 
welcomed by the Statute of Liberty. Despite this tradition of open-
ness, a skeptical, restrictionist view of immigration has equally deep 
historical roots, and a growing number of Americans believe that 
we must liinit immigration or risk jeopardizing our national future. 
Peter Brimelow, a senior editor at both Forbes and The National 
Review, has become a recognized proponent of severe immigration 
restrictions. Brimelow and his book, Alien Nation: Common Sense 
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. B.A. 1974, Yale University; 
J.D. 1978, University of California, Berkeley. - Ed. For their generous help (but not neces-
sarily their agreement), I owe thanks to Joseph Albert, Linda Bosniak, Curtis Bradley, 
Gabriel J. Chin, Richard Collins, Philip Frickey, Daniel Home, Kevin Johnson, Daniel Ko-
walski, Carol Lehman, Kathleen Maness;-Kevin Reitz, John Scanlan, Peter Schuck, David 
Sippel, Erica Tarpey, Nadine Wettstein, Frank Wu, participants in a faculty workshop at the 
University of Colorado School of Law, and participants in the Immigration Law Workshop in 
Albuquerque, New Mexico, June 2-4, 1994, where I first ventured forth with the central ideas 
discussed here. I am also indebted to Melissa Decker and Judith Smith for excellent research 
assistance and numerous valuable suggestions on earlier drafts. 
1. See Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus, in EMMA LAZARUS: SELECTIONS FROM HER 
POETRY AND PROSE 40, 41 (Morris U. Schappes ed., 1944) (poem written for Bartholdi Ped-
estal Fund in 1883, now inscribed on a plaque on the Statue of Liberty). 
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About America's Immigration Disaster,2 have generated a great 
deal of interest. Reviews by prominent commentators in respected 
publications put Alien Nation in the spotlight.3 Brimelow even 
presented his views to Congress4 during its still-continuing consid-
eration of immigration-slashing proposals.5 Like it or not, his per-
spective has influenced the current immigration debate. 
Alien Nation uses simple and straightforward language - in the 
style of a radio talk show - to advance two major arguments 
against immigration. One is economic. Drawing heavily on the 
work of George Borjas,6 Brimelow argues that immigration has not 
contributed to America's economic success but has instead precipi-
tated its economic decline (pp. 137-77). He offers the example of 
Japan and its extremely restrictive attitudes toward immigration to 
argue that a nation can achieve economic prosperity without a sig-
nifi.cant immigrant flow (pp. 168-72). 
Despite Brimelow's lengthy discussion of economic considera-
tions, it becomes plain - and Brimelow himself acknowledges (pp. 
56, 177) - that the crux of his case against immigration is cultural, 
not economic. Brimelow grounds this cultural argument in consid-
erations of race and ethnicity. As he puts it, "[e]thnicity is destiny 
in American politics" (p. 195; emphasis omitted). For Brimelow, 
United States immigration law has gone wrong because it has un-
dermined what he terms "a plain historical fact: that the American 
nation has always had a specific ethnic core. And that core has 
been white" (p. 10). He elaborates: "As late as 1950, somewhere 
up to nine out of ten Americans looked like me. That is, they were 
of European stock. And in those days, they had another name for 
this thing dismissed so contemptuously as 'the racial hegemony of 
white Americans.' They C"Uled it 'America.' "7 
2. The book expands on Peter Brimelow, Time to Rethink Immigration? The Decline of 
Americanization of Immigrants, NATL. REV., June 22, 1992, at 30. See p. 3. 
3. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Alien Rumination, 105 YALE LJ. 1963 (1996); Michael Lind, 
American by Invitation, THE NEw YoRKER, Apr. 24, 1995, at 107-13; Jack Miles, The Coming 
Immigration Debate, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1995, at 130-40; Samuel Francis, Hercu-
les and the Hydra, NATL. REv., May 1, 1995, at 76-77 (book review); Francis Fukuyama, 
Culture Vulture, NATL. REv., May 1, 1995, at 77-78 (book review); Nathan Glazer, What He 
Should Have Said, NATL. REV., May 1, 1995, at 78-79 (book review); Glenn Loury, Terms of 
Engagement, NATL. REV., May 1, 1995, at 79-80 (book review); Peter Skerry, Closing the 
Door, COMMENTARY, May 1995, at 70-73 (book review). 
4. See Statement of Peter Brimelow, House Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, 
1995 WL 10386204 (May 17, 1995). 
5. See, e.g., H.R. 2202, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (Smith, R-Tex), S. 1394, 104th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1995) (Simpson, R-Wy). 
6. See GEORGE J. BORJAS, FRIENDS OR STRANGERS: THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON 
THE U.S. ECONOMY 79-97 (1990). 
7. P. 59; see also p. 197 ("Remember - practically until the Civil War, white Protestants 
were America."). 
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Brimelow does not bother to mention Native Americans, except 
to quote approvingly the Declaration of Independence where it de-
nounces "the merciless Indian Savages."8 He dismisses African 
Americans by reminding us that they were just property: 
To get a sense of perspective, we have to go back to the beginning. 
And in the beginning, the American nation was white. 
That sounds shocking because blacks were almost a fifth (19.3 per-
cent) of the total population within the borders of the original Thir-
teen Colonies. But almost all these blacks were slaves. They had no 
say in public affairs. They were excluded from what I have called the 
political nation - aka "the racial hegemony of white Americans" ... 
aka "America." And the first federal naturalization law in 1790 was 
absolutely explicit about this: applicants for citizenship had to be 
"free white persons."9 
Brimelow warns that for America "the breaking of ... 'the ra-
cial hegemony of white Americans' " (p. 122; emphasis omitted) 
portends radical social upheaval, which he compares to the fall of 
the Roman Empire (pp. 131-33). On this same theme, he writes: 
"[t]here is no precedent for a sovereign country undergoing such a 
rapid and radical transformation of its ethnic character in the entire 
history of the world."10 Brimelow's response? 
It is simply common sense that Americans have a legitimate inter-
est in their country's racial balance. It is common sense that they 
have a right to insist that their government stop shifting it. Indeed, it 
seems to me that they have a right to insist that it be shifted back.11 
He contends that our empire will fall if current immigration pat-
terns continue to make our society multi-racial and multi-ethnic.12 
Brimelow squarely blames the 1965 Immigration Act for this 
drop in the white share of the population.13 The 1965 Act abolished 
the "national origins" system that had dominated immigration law 
since the 1920s. As a general rule, the national origins system lim-
ited immigration from a country to two percent of the total number 
of people already in the United States with that ancestry in 1920. In 
practice, this system strongly favored immigrants from Northern 
and Western Europe. Brimelow complains that but for the 1965 
8. P. 209 (emphasis omitted). Brimelow relies on passages in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence and the Federalist Papers that he sees as assuming an .American ethnic and cultural 
homogeneity. P. 210. 
9. Pp. 66-67. Here Brimelow refers to the Act of March 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103. 
10. P. 57; see also p. 129 (making same statement). 
11. P. 264; see also p. 232 (posing The National Question). 
12. See pp. 129-33. It is thus fitting that Brimelow's book shares its title with the movie, 
Alien Nation, starring James Caan and Mandy Patinkin, about the unsuccessful efforts to 
"assimilate" by "aliens" from outer space who land in California. I am grateful to Frank Wu 
for calling this to my attention. 
13. See Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 
Stat. 911 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1351 (1995)). 
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Act, "the American population would still be where it was in 1960: 
almost 89 percent white" (p. 90). 
Brimelow repeatedly warns us that immigrants - given their 
racial and ethnic composition and higher fertility rates - will re-
duce whites to a minority of the United States population by the 
mid-twenty-first century (pp. 62, 74, 96, 137). To drive this point 
home, Brimelow invokes the image of white America in the grasp 
of "pincers." He displays a graph in which whites are squeezed 
over time by a growing Hispanic population - rising from the bot-
tom of the graph - and by a growing Asian and black population 
- choking them from above (p. 63). 
Brimelow professes some concern that immigration adversely 
affects African Americans (pp. 173-75). Yet, he provokes: "when 
you enter the INS waiting rooms you find yourself in an underworld 
that is not just teeming but is also almost entirely colored" (p. 28). 
He adds: "You have to be totally incurious not to wonder: where 
do all these people get off and come to the surface?" (p. 28). 
Brimelow asserts that were it not for U.S. immigration policy, Colin 
Ferguson, with his "hatred of whites," would not have come to this 
country, and no one would have been killed in the Long Island Rail 
Road shootings (pp. 6-7). Brimelow warns us not to "embrace" 
Haitian refugees because they may be HIV-positive (p. 113). He 
tells us that seventy-five percent of Nigerians are involved in perpe-
trating fraud schemes (p. 186), and that the "legacy of Chaka, ' 
founder of the Zulu Empire ... is not that of Alfred the Great, let 
alone that of Elizabeth II or any civilized society" (p. 108). He ap-
provingly quotes President Calvin Coolidge's view: "America must 
be kept American," and adds that: "Everyone knew what he 
meant" (p. 211). In case the meaning is unclear, here is what Coo-
lidge said in 1921: "America must be kept American. Biological 
laws show ... that Nordics deteriorate when mixed with other 
races."14 
Even on its own terms, Brimelow's argument is flawed analyti-
cally. For example, his projections rely on fragile assumptions 
about future fertility and mortality rates. Moreover, he fails to see 
that race is a social construct.15 The accuracy of Brimelow's demo-
graphic predictions depends on who calls themselves "white. "16 
But racial categorization is inexact, especially for Hispanics and 
Asians and especially given the rising rate of intermarriage, a diffi-
14. See Lind, supra note 3, at 108 (quoting a 1921 Gooo HOUSEKEEPING article by then 
Vice President Coolidge). 
15. See, e.g., Ian F. Haney-L6pez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations 
on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994); Fukuyama, supra 
note 3. 
16. Brimelow acknowledges some of these uncertainties. See p. 67. 
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culty that Brimelow mentions but does not take seriously.17 
Brimelow claims that early in this century "immigration from the 
traditional northern and western European sources meant that not 
all immigrants were alien to American eyes" (p. 59). In fact, early 
twentieth-century restrictionists viewed Italians and Eastern 
Europeans (especially Jews) as outside their "race." Earlier and in 
like manner, many who sought to preserve American "racial pu-
rity" in the mid-nineteenth century did not consider the Irish to be-
long to the same race as Anglo-Saxon Protestant immigrants.18 
These analytical flaws, however, are not what is most disturbing 
about Alien Nation. Much more troubling is Brirnelow's essential 
perspective on race, ethnicity, and immigration. Brirnelow, and 
others who fear "they" will overwhelm "us," naively and invidiously 
ignore those of "us" who not only welcome "them" but also see 
"them" as vital to our national self-interest. The rest of this essay 
discusses this problem with Alien Nation. 
In immigration as elsewhere, race is a difficult, often uncomfort-
able, and even incendiary topic - but we, as Americans, avoid it 
only at our great peril. There is a reason that Alien Nation has re-
ceived so much attention. Brirnelow's call to reverse current racial 
and ethnic demographic trends resonates deeply with the many who 
feel threatened by these changes. Their fear surely fortified public 
support for California's Proposition 187, which won fifty-nine per-
cent of the vote in November 1994.19 It may be tempting to dismiss 
Brirnelow himself as little more than an advocate of "old-fashioned 
white racial nationalism."20 But to understand and criticize 
Brirnelow's perspective, we need to go beyond the simple question: 
Is he a "racist"? Indeed, much of this essay discusses why such la-
beling is often quite difficult in the immigration context. Ironically, 
if Alien Nation has any value at all, it is that its simplistic approach 
forces us to grapple more carefully with this important, complex 
17. See pp. 273-74. For a similar point, see Schuck, supra note 3, at 1999 (citing Mary C. 
Waters, ETHNIC OPTioNs: CHoosING IDENTITIES IN AMERICA 16-51 (1990)). On the increas-
ing number of "multiracial" Americans, see Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: 
It's Not Just Black and White Anymore, 41 STAN. L. REv. 957, 964-69 (1995). 
18. See, e.g., MADISON GRANT, THE PASSING OF TIIE GREAT RACE 68-82 (1916); Wnj" 
UAM z. RIPLEY, THE RACES OF EUROPE {1899). For background, see JOHN HIGHAM, 
STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM 1860-1925, at 131-57 (2d ed. 
1963). 
19. Proposition 187 would deny most public services, including nonemergency medical 
services and public education, to undocumented aliens. It would also require certain govern-
ment workers to verify the immigration status of persons with whom they come into contact 
and to report suspected undocumented aliens to enforcement agencies. Court injunctions 
have kept almost all of its provisions from taking effect; see League of United Latin Ameri-
can Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 763 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 1995); Pedro A. v. Dawson, Case 
No. 965089 (Cal. Super. Ct., City & County of San Francisco, filed Nov. 9, 1994). 
20. Lind, supra note 3, at 108. 
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question: How should we take race and ethnicity into account in 
making immigration law and policy? 
II. THE 1965 Acr AND OTHER STORIES 
There is no doubt that the racial and ethnic composition of im-
migrants has shifted dramatically in the past forty years. From 1951 
through 1960, fifty-three percent of our legal immigrants came from 
Europe.21 In fiscal year 1993, only eighteen percent came from Eu-
rope, while over seventy-five percent came from Asia and Latin 
America.22 The European share of current immigration would fall 
further if we included undocumented immigration.23 
To understand what happened in 1965 and to assess Brimelow's 
call to undo the past thirty years, we must examine the immigration 
system tP.at the 1965 Act replaced. Before 1875, immigration was 
regulated only by the states, if at all.24 The first federal immigration 
law appeared in 1875.25 The earliest federal statutes listed grounds 
for excluding aliens, and later statutes added deportation grounds.26 
The Im.migration Act of 1921 provisionally adopted the first numer-
ical restrictions on immigration in the form of the national origins 
system. For eligible countries, this system allowed annual immigra-
tion for up to three percent of "the number of foreign-born persons 
of such nationality resident in the United States as determined by 
the United States census of 1910."27 
In 1924, Congress made the national origins system permanent 
and limited immigration from outside the Western Hemisphere to 
150,000 annually. The 1924 Act also reduced the limit to two per-
21. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, U.S. DEPT. OF JusTICE, INS 
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 27, Table 2 (1993). 
22. See id. at 28. 
23. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ILLEGAL ALIENS: DESPITE DATA LIMITA· 
TIONS, CURRENT METHODS PROVIDE BE.TIER POPULATION ESTIMATES 46-57 (1993); 
ROBERT WARREN, EsnMATES OF THE RESIDENT ILLEGAL ALIEN POPULATION: OCTOBER 
1992, at 1, 4-10 (Immigration and Naturalization Service Statistics Division 1993). 
24. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 
93 CoLUM. L. REv. 1833 (1993). 
25. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat 477 (exclusion, repealed 1974). The only ear-
lier federal statutes on the general subject of immigration were the Alien and Sedition Acts 
of 1798. See Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, § 1, 1 Stat. 570, 571 (pennitting the President to 
order any alien whom he judges "dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States" to 
leave the country without a hearing); Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, § 1, 1 Stat. 577, 577 (pennit-
ting the President during war to apprehend, restrain, secure, and remove all enemy aliens 
without a hearing) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 21-23). 
26. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214 (exclusion, repealed 1917); Act of 
Oct 19, 1888, ch. 1210, 25 Stat. 566 (deportation, repealed 1917); Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, 
26 Stat 1084, 1086 (exclusion and deportation, repealed 1917); Act ofFeb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, 
34 Stat. 898 (exclusion and deportation). 
27. Act of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, § 2(a), 42 Stat. 5 (repealed 1952). 
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cent and changed the baseline year to 1890.28 Changing the base-
line year materially favored immigrants from Northern and 
Western Europe because the great waves from Southern and East-
ern Europe did not arrive until after 1890.29 Finally, this Act also 
provided that in 1927 the baseline year would change again - to 
1920 - and that the 150,000 ceiling would be divided up pro rata 
according to ancestry, not foreign birthplace.30 Immigrants from 
the Western Hemisphere countries had to meet qualitative require-
ments but remained free of numerical limits. 
While the 1924 Act disadvantaged Southern and Eastern Euro-
pean immigrants, at least they were not barred from coming. His-
torically, American immigration policy has expressly selected 
immigrants and citizens on the basis of national origin and race.31 
Starting in 1882, the Chinese Exclusion Acts cut off virtually all 
Chinese immigration.32 In like manner, the "Gentlemen's Agree-
ment" of 1907-08 between the Japanese and United States govern-
ments severely limited immigration from Japan,33 and the 1924 Act 
prohibited it completely.34 The 1917 Immigration Act prohibited 
immigration from an "Asiatic barred zone"; it also excluded anyone 
who traced his ancestry to those countries.35 The statute excluded 
practically all blacks - "the descendants of slave immigrants" -
from the national origins system calculations.36 
Naturalization laws were similarly race-based. The original nat-
uralization laws made only "free white persons" eligible.37 In 1870, 
"persons of African descent" became eligible,38 but other racial 
28. See Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § ll{a), 43 Stat. 153, 159 (repealed 1952). 
29. See E.P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POI.ICY 
1798-1965, at 484 (1981) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 350, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1924)); 
John A. Scanlan, Immigration Law and the Illusion of Numerical Control, 36 U. MIAMI L. 
REv. 819, 826 n.31 {1982) (arguing that the baseline change was a deliberate effort to limit 
immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe). 
30. See Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § ll(b), 43 Stat. 153, 159. 
31. For a useful summary, see Scanlan, supra note.29, at 823 nn.12-13. 
32. See Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58; Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, 23 Stat. 115; 
Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25. 
33. See generally, ROGER DANIELS, ASIAN AMERICA: CHINESE AND JAPANESE IN THE 
UNITED STATES SINCE 1850, at 123-28 (1988). 
34. Japanese exclusion was not accomplished by expressly naming Japan, but through a 
neutral phrase - "aliens ineligible to citizenship" - that was clearly intended to have that 
effect. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 13( c), 43 Stat. 153, 162 (referring to "aliens ineligi-
ble to citizenship"). On the intent of the phrase, see RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A 
DIFFERENT SHORE 208-lQ {1989). 
35. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875-76. See BILL ONG HING, MAK-
ING AND REMAKING ASIAN AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1850-1990, at 32 
(1993). 
36. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § ll{d), 43 Stat. 153, 159. 
37. See Act of March 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103. 
38. Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254; 256. 
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bars continued long after that. During the 1920s the Supreme 
Court twice declared Asians ineligible to naturalize.39 "Races in-
digenous to the Western Hemisphere" remained ineligible until 
1940,40 and Chinese were unable to naturalize until 1943.41 Only in 
1952 did citizenship become open to all regardless of race or na-
tional origin.42 
The 1965 Act abolished the national origins system. A new se-
lection system, which took full effect on July 1, 1968, limited immi-
gration from outside the Western Hemisphere to 170,000 per year. 
This annual limit was divided into seven "preference" categories for 
various close relatives of citizens and noncitizen permanent resi-
dents, for workers of various skill levels, and for refugees. Immi-
gration from any single country was capped at 20,000 per year. This 
basic scheme has endured to the present day, with some 
modifications.43 
What went "wrong" in 1965 to increase Asian and Latin Ameri-
can immigration so dramatically? Brimelow seems to trace the in-
crease in Latin American immigration to the 1965 Act (pp. 60-61), 
but this argument is hard to understand. The 1965 Congress feared 
a dramatic increase in Latin American immigration44 and restricted 
it accordingly.45 Before the 1965 Act, any Mexican who could pass 
a Spanish-language literacy test - and who bothered to go through 
immigration formalities, which many did not - could enter as a 
lawful permanent resident. The Act changed this by adopting the 
first-ever numerical limit on Western Hemisphere immigration -
120,000 annually.46 
Although Brimelow is right that Asian immigration increased 
under the 1965 Act, he misunderstands how.47 Brimelow argues 
39. See, e.g., United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923) (Asian Indians); Ozawa v. 
United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922) (Japanese). 
40. Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1137, 1140. 
41. See Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600. 
42. See Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952). 
43. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, §§ 101, 102, 104 Stat. 4978, 4980-
85; Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-653, § 4, 100 Stat. 
3655, 3655; Act of Oct. 5, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-412, § 3, 92 Stat. 907, 907. 
44. See Scanlan, supra note 29, at 830 (citing CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. IMMIGRA-
TION LAw AND POLICY, 1952-1979, at 54 (1979), quoting H. REP. No. 745, 89th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 48 (1965)). In the process of legislative compromise, the Western Hemisphere limit was 
"a price to be paid for abolishing the national origins systems." SELECT COMMISSION ON 
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND TiiE NATIONAL IN-
TEREST (Staff Report) 208 (1981). 
45. Schuck points out this "delicious irony." See Schuck, supra note 3, at 1975. 
46. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 21(e), 79 Stat. 
911, 920-21. Legislation in 1978 combined the Eastern and Western Hemisphere ceilings into 
a single worldwide ceiling. See Act of Oct. 5, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-412, § 1, 92 Stat. 907, 907. 
47. Under the prevailing view, the supporters of the 1965 Act in Congress did not predict 
the dramatic increase in Asian immigration that followed. See, e.g., ROGER DANIELS, COM· 
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that the Act changed the ethnic composition of the immigrant fl.ow 
by discarding the national origins system's bias in favor of Europe-
ans, especially Northern and Western Europeans.48 This argument 
overlooks the effects of the 1965 Act's new immigration categories, 
which put greater emphasis on family reunification and made job-
based immigration more difficult. Citizens could petition for their 
spouses, children, and siblings to immigrate. Permanent residents 
could petition for their spouses and children. In tum, all of these 
immigrants could later petition for their qualifying relatives. With 
these changes, the overall number of immigrants increased far be-
yond Congress's expectations.49 
Suppose we were to do as Brimelow urges and undo the effects 
of the 1965 Act.50 We could, for example, restore the predomi-
nantly Northern and Western European character of immigration 
- assuming sufficient numbers to shift the racial balance would 
want to come. Or we could allow in only "white" immigrants. 
Brimelow sees these as easy solutions. But immigration policy goes 
beyond mere statistics. It also reflects a society's most basic values. 
What values must we abandon before we can restore pro-European 
bias to immigration policy? 
To answer this question we must first understand the 1965 Act's 
place in broader historical trends in both American immigration 
law and public law generally. The 1965 Act marked the full adop-
tion of a basic nondiscrimination principle in American immigra-
tion law. In so doing, it crystallized the sentiments that had already 
led to the repeal of the laws barring Asian immigration and 
naturalization.51 
The predecessor to the 1965 Act - the 1952 McCarran-Walter 
Act - left many discriminatory provisions intact. It limited immi-
gration from the Asiatic barred zone, modified and relabeled the 
ING TO AMERICA: A HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION AND ETHNICITY IN AMERICAN LIFE 338-44 
(1990); HING, supra note 35, at 39-41; DA vm M. REIMERS, STILL THE GOLDEN DooR: THE 
THIRD WORLD COMES TO AMERICA 74-91 (2d ed. 1992). See generally HUTCHINSON, supra 
note 29, at 366-79. For persuasive observations to the contrary, see Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil 
Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at the Immigration and National-
ity Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REv. (forthcoming 1996) (manuscript on file with author). 
48. Brimelow characterizes this change as "de facto discrimination against Europe." P. 
79. Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Germany, and Ireland received over two-thirds of the 
158,000 immigrant visas authorized annually under the 1952 Act. In fact, large numbers of 
immigrant visas went unused each year because of insufficient demand. See Thomas J. 
Scully, ls the Door Open Again? - A Survey of Our New Immigration Law, 13 UCLA L. 
REV. 227, 229 (1966). 
49. See, e.g., REIMERS, supra note 47, at 83. 
50. "The 1965 Immigration Act, and its amplifications in 1986 and 1990, has been a disas-
ter and must be repealed." P. 258. 
51. Cf. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (eliminating racial 
qualifications for citizenship); id. at§§ 202(b)-(c), 66 Stat. at 177-78 (ending Japanese exclu-
sion); Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600 (repealing Chinese exclusion). 
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"Asia-Pacific Triangle," to 2,000 immigrants annually, with ex-
tremely small allotments for individual countries. It allowed only 
105 immigrants of Chinese descent per year regardless of their 
birthplace.52 Because the McCarran-Walter Act also retained the 
national origins system, President Truman vetoed it53 - but Con-
gress overrode the veto. Truman charged that the "greatest vice" of 
the national origins system was "that it discriminate[ d], deliberately 
and intentionally, against many of the peoples of the world,"54 and 
that it violated "the great political doctrine of the Declaration of 
Independence that 'all men are created equal.' "55 His Commission 
on Immigration and Naturalization had similarly harsh words.56 
Just thirteen years later, the 1965 Act abolished the national ori-
gins system. Why? This change makes sense only in light of two 
parallel developments - the Civil Rights Act of 196457 and the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965.58 Many in Congress saw the end of the 
national origins system as the necessary international component of 
a comprehensive civil rights program. Some of these arguments fo-
cused on the domestic scene,59 and others focused on the foreign 
policy implications, especially in the context of the Cold War and 
the growing American involvement in Vietnam.60 In signing the 
52. See Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, §§ 202{b)-{c), 66 Stat. 163, 177-78. The 
2,000-visa limit was eliminated in 1961. See Act of Sept. 26, 1961, § 9, Pub. L. No. 87-301, 75 
Stat. 650, 654. 
53. See The President's Veto Message, reprinted in 6 OSCAR M. TRELLES & JAMES F. 
BAILEY, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY Acrs: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES AND RELATED 
DocuMENTS 275 (1979) (vetoing the bill to revise the laws relating to immigration and na-
tionality, and for other purposes). 
54. Id. at 277. 
55. Id. at 278. 
56. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, WHOM WE 
SHALL WELCOME 52-56 {1953); see also Harry N. Rosenfield, The Prospects for Immigration 
Amendments, 21 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBs. 401, 409-18 {1956) {discussing the popular opposi-
tion to the national origins system). 
57. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
58. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 
u.s.c. s. 1973-1973bb-l (1988)). 
59. See, e.g., Statement of W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor (Mar. 18, 1965), in 10 
OSCAR M. TRELLES & JAMES F. BAILEY, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY Acrs: LEOISLA· 
TIVE HISTORIES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS 114 {1979) (stating that all three proposals 
"write into our laws the essential principle of the free society: that we hold each other in 
equal respect, without false prejudice !llld without one member's using his own image to 
measure his neighbor's rights"); Statement of Rep. Annunzio (Apr. 6, 1965), id. at 162, 163 
("It seems strange to me that at a time when the Congress is taking vigorous action to insure 
that no American will be denied their full privilege of citizenship because of race, we still 
maintain an immigration policy which relegates millions of other Americans to second-class 
citizenship because of national origin."); see also Letter From the President to the Speaker of 
the House, 111 CoNG. REC. 20,996 {daily ed. Aug. 25, 1965). 
60. See, e.g., Statement of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State (March 11, 1965), in 10 TRELLES 
& BAILEY, supra note 59, at 88 ("[W]e are concerned to see that our immigration laws reflect 
our real character and objectives because what other people think about us plays an impor-
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1965 Act into law at the base of the Statue of Liberty, President 
Johnson declared that it "repair[ s] a deep and painful flaw in the 
fabric of American justice .... The days of unlimited immigration 
are past. But those who do come will come because of what they 
are, not because of the land from which they sprung."61 
Since 1965, nondiscrimination principles have shaped areas of 
immigration law not directly touched by the repeal of the national 
origins system. The Refugee Act of 1980 provides one example.62 
While this Act allowed foreign policy and other ad hoc factors to 
influence the selection of some overseas refugees, it largely rejected 
selection based on country of origin. Furthermore, it commanded 
that "uniform and neutral standards" govern asylum decisions.63 
That America is "a nation of immigrants" is superficially a dem-
ographic observation about how many of our ancestors came from 
foreign lands and how long ago. More fundamentally, however, it is 
a statement of civic values. In denouncing the 1965 Act as "a na-
tional emotional spasm" (p. 98), Brimelow rejects - or trivializes 
- core constitutional values such as equality before the law. He 
yearns to return not only to pre-1965 immigration law, but also to 
pre-1965 America.64 His discussion of African Americans shows 
that he really wants to tum back the clock even further, not just 
tant role in the achievement of our foreign policies."); Statement of Rep. de la Garza (Apr. 6, 
1965), id. at 191, 192 ("At a time when the true spirit and philosophy of the United States 
must be made evident to the world, we can no longer afford to have on our statute books any 
reference to the fact that people are welcome to this country depending upon their race or 
ethnic origin."); Statement of Rep. Fino (Apr. 6, 1965), id. at 193, 195 ("Isn't it embarrassing 
for a country that in 1964 passed the Civil Rights Act as an affirmation of the fact that all 
men were to be treated equal under the law to retain an immigration law that says in fact that 
all men from other countries were not created equal?; [the bill] will bring our immigration 
policy into line with our foreign policy."). On the broader connection between the civil rights 
movement and foreign policy, see Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 
41 STAN. L REV. 61 (1988). 
61. Remarks at the Signing of the Immigration Bill, Liberty Island, New York, in Pusuc 
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENIS OF THE UNITED STATES: LYNDON B. JOHNSON 1037, 1038-39 
(1966). Brimelow himself notes the link. See P. 76; see also Vernon M. Briggs, Jr., MASS 
IMMIGRATION AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 104 (1992); DANIELS, supra note 47, at 338. 
Professor Peter Schuck similarly notes the connection between the 1965 Act and domestic 
civil rights legislation as part of his analysis of the stresses that immigration places on the 
traditional civil rights coalition. Peter H. Schuck, The New Immigration and the Old Civil 
Rights, 15 AMERICAN PROSPECT 102, 103 ("This law was in fact a momentous civil rights 
victory, extending the notion of equal treatment beyond U.S. bord~rs to national and ethnic 
groups traditionally disfavored by our immigration laws. That it also contributed to the coali-
tion's future decline is an arresting political irony."). 
62. Act of Mar. 17, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102. 
63. See id. § lOl(b) (providing "comprehensive and uniform provisions for the effective 
resettlement and absorption of those refugees who are admitted"). See also Arthur C. 
Helton, Political Asylum Under the 1980 Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled Promise, 17 U. MICH. 
J.L. REF. 243, 250-62 (1984). 
64. Brimelow asks, "[W]hat was wrong with America as it existed in 1965?" P. 274. In 
spite of his disdain for the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Brimelow argues in defense of the 
America of 1965 that at that time "the federal government was intervening massively 
throughout the South to prevent voting fraud." P. 106. Elsewhere, Brimelow dodges ques-
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before Brown v. Board of Education, but before the Emancipation 
Proclamation. · 
Brimelow also rejects core constitutional values in his un-
abashed praise for "Operation Wetback," the 1954 government 
program that rounded up and expelled great numbers of Mexican 
workers and their families - plus some United States citizens of 
Mexican ancestry.65 He commented in an interview that "[t]he ille-
gal immigration crisis in the 1950s was ended in a few months by 
the Eisenhower administration through its famous Operation Wet-
back. Which I essentially think should be reproduced, you should 
do it again."66 In so saying, he grossly overstates the effectiveness 
of Operation Wetback in blocking the already well-established mi-
gration routes from Mexico to the United States. Brimelow also 
rejects - or trivializes - the equal protection and due process im-
plications of an enforcement strategy that targets persons on the 
basis of appearance. 67 
Brimelow can point to the policies of Japan and other closed-
door countries for support only because he views immigration as 
divorced from any social context. Japan's immigration policies re-
flect a sense of national community and civic values that is radically 
different from our American sense. 68 How Japan or other countries 
regulate immigration sheds precious little light on how America 
should (pp. 250-54). 
Ill. NONDISCRIMINATION, RACE, AND ETHNICITY IN 
IMMIGRATION LAW 
Brimelow gives simplistic answers to complex questions. He ac-
knowledges the difficulties of defining discrimination in immigra-
tion policy (p. 104), but then he shirks the task. Yet, these 
questions - about race, ethnicity, and immigration - are impor-
tions about America before 1965 by saying, "[m]aybe America should not have been like 
this. But it was." P. 15. 
65. See KITI"Y CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION 
AND THE J.N.S. 54 {1992); JUAN RAMON GARCfA, OPERATION WETBACK: THE MASS DE· 
PORTATION OF MEXICAN UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN 1954, at 194-96 {1980). 
66. See Interview with SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, at GS (June 4, 1995); see also pp. 34-
35, 260; Peter Brimelow, COMMENTARY Nov. 1995, at 34, 35. 
67. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) recently settled a class action that 
alleged that its Border Patrol relied solely on Hispanic appearance to stop, question, and 
detain students, graduates, and staff of an El Paso, Texas, high school located next to the 
U.S.-Mexico border. After a preliminary injunction, the INS agreed in the settlement to 
provide the public with information and assistance in filing complaints against the Border 
Patrol. See Murillo v. Musegades, 809 F. Supp. 487 {W.D. Tex. 1992) (preliminary injunc-
tion), digested at 71 INTERPRETER RELEASES 987 (1994). 
68. See generally Daniel H. Foote, Japan's "Foreign Workers" Policy: A View From the 
United States, 7 GEo. IMMIGR. LJ. 707, 711-12 (1993). 
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tant, and they demand cogent answers. So we must ask: what 
makes some immigration decisions intolerably "discriminatory"? 
Constitutional principles usually provide a framework for, and 
set outer boundaries on, legislative and executive decisionmaking. 
They also influence the eventual subconstitutional interpretation of 
those legislative and executive decisions.69 In short, a dialogue be-
tween politics and constitutional law usually informs our encounters 
with race and ethnicity. Unfortunately, those constitutional princi-
ples provide little guidance on how to deal with race and ethnicity 
in immigration law and policy. Would Brimelow's proposal to re-
store the predominantly white character of immigration to the 
United States be constitutional? Would the national origins system, 
if reenacted, be constitutional? 
Because of the "plenary power doctrine," the answers to these 
questions are unclear. Created by judges near the end of the nine-
teenth century, this doctrine gives Congress and the Executive 
Branch broad and often exclusive authority in immigration matters. 
Due to its existence, courts have been reluctant to apply constitu-
tional norms and principles to immigration statutes and regulations. 
As a result, the growth of constitutional immigration law has been 
stunted severely, and any dialogue between politics and constitu-
tional principles in immigration law has been largely cut off. 
There are signs, however, that constitutional immigration law is 
slowly emerging from a long dormant period.70 Courts have gradu-
ally expanded constitutional review in this area, especially for pro-
cedural due process.71 Although substantive challenges have met 
with less success, courts have seriously considered equal protection 
claims in some immigration cases. For instance, in Francis v. INS, 72 
the Second Circuit reviewed a rule that governed the availability of 
certain exclusion and deportation waivers. The Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals had ruled that permanent residents could apply for 
the waivers if they had traveled outside the United States but not if 
they had remained in the country. The court found the distinction 
was irrational, and thus a violation of equal protection. More re-
cently, nondiscrimination principles prevailed when the govern-
69. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phan-
tom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE LJ. 545, 560-64 (1990) 
[hereinafter Motomura, Phantom Norms]. 
70. For a succinct analysis of the current state of the doctrine, see Stephen H. Legomsky, 
Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 HAsT. CoNST. 
LQ. 925 (1995). 
71. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Sur-
rogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 CoLUM. L. REv. 1625 (1992) [hereinafter 
Motomura, Procedural Surrogates]. 
72. 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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ment agreed, in the settlement of the American Baptist Churches73 
litigation, to end its practice of treating Guatemalan and Salvado-
ran asylum seekers differently. Equal protection also plays a key 
role in procedural due process claims, which often succeed because 
of a difference between the procedures that two groups of similarly 
situated aliens receive.74 
Constitutional nondiscrimination principles also guide the judi-
cial interpretation of immigration statutes and other subconstitu-
tional immigration texts. For example, the 1985 Supreme Court 
decision in Jean v. Nelson1s interpreted certain immigration statutes 
and regulations to bar race and national origin discrimination even 
when they did not do so expressly. Thus, the Court applied an 
equality norm subconstitutionally where it seemed unwilling to in-
voke constitutional grounds. 
In the past few years, the nondiscrimination question has arisen 
in connection with several important immigration policies. Since 
1981, the United States has interdicted Haitians on the high seas 
before they could reach our shores and apply for asylum. Before 
May 1992 and after May 1994, these would-be refugees received an 
abbreviated asylum process, either aboard a ship or at an on-shore 
location outside the United States, for example Guantanamo Naval 
Base. From May 1992 to May 1994, we repatriated Haitians with-
out even this abbreviated procedure. Their African ancestry and 
our more favorable treatment of generally lighter-skinned Cubans 
prompted charges of racism.76 In August 1994, the Clinton Admin-
istration responded to an influx of Cubans sailing to Florida in 
small homemade rafts by interdicting them as well.77 Ships now in-
terdict both Haitians and Cubans. Nonetheless, Cubans continue to 
receive uniquely favorable treatment. Under a special September 
73. American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796, 799-800 (N.D. Cal. 
1991). See also American Baptist Churches v. Meese, 712 F. Supp. 756, 772 (N.D. Cal. 1989) 
("[G]overnmental policy that makes nationality-based distinctions should at least be re-
viewed for equal protection violations."). 
74. See, e.g., Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (perma-
nent injunction), affd. sub nom Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 
1990) (affirmed on subconstitutional grounds only); Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. 
Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (preliminary injunction). For a fuller discussion, see Motomura, 
Procedural Surrogates, supra note 71, at 1673-79. 
75. 472 U.S. 846 (1985); see Motomura, Phantom Norms, supra note 69, at 587-93. 
76. See, e.g., Aristide Renounces Treaty Allowing U.S. to Return Haitians, 71 INTER· 
PRETER RELEASES 481, 483 (1994) (reporting on a news conference held by the Congres-
sional Black Caucus and other civil rights organizations to denounce the interdiction and 
return policy as "racist"); Malissia Lennox, Note, Refugees, Racism, and Reparations: A Cri· 
tique of the United States' Haitian Immigration Policy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 687, 714-23 (1993). 
77. See "A Slow-Motion Mariel": Cubans (and Haitians) Take to Sea, 71 INTERPRETER 
RELEASES 1091, 1091 (1994). 
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1994 agreement, the United States will allow 20,000 Cubans to im-
migrate here each year.1s 
Whether our policy toward Haitians is discriminatory or even 
racist is a complex question. As Professor Stephen Legomsky has 
noted, current refugee admissions do not discriminate unfairly 
against Canadians just because very few Canadians qualify.79 Equal 
protection does not necessarily lead to equal outcomes. We may 
treat Cubans better than Haitians because we want to welcome 
those fleeing Communist regimes, or because we prefer immigrants 
with higher education and skill levels or a strong network of compa-
triots in the United States. Even assuming that these explanations 
run afoul of the Refugee Act's statutory call for uniform and neu-
tral principles, they do not necessarily violate equal protection. We 
might compare Haitians not with Cubans, but with Salvadorans and 
Guatemalans - nonblack asylum seekers from non-Communist 
Western hemisphere countries - who have not fared well under 
our asylum law. 
These explanations notwithstanding, the fact remains that the 
U.S. policy toward Haitians treats a predominantly black group un-
favorably. When does an immigration law discriminate based on 
race so as to violate equal protection? The U.S. policy toward Hai-
tians does not rely expressly on race, but does it reflect the race-
conscious intent generally required for a findi!ig of invidious dis-
crimination ?80 Can critics of the policy show more than a dispro-
portionate impact on blacks, which is generally insufficient to find 
an equal protection violation? Will courts accept proof of intent 
that falls short of true motivation ?81 Will it be enough to show that 
race was one of several factors considered by the policymakers? 
Alternatively, do.es the policy unconstitutionally discriminate on 
the basis of national origin? An amicus brief filed by the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in 
the most recent Supreme Court challenge to our Haitian interdic-
tion policy argued that the policy constitutes national origin dis-
crimination. The brief pointed to "an extensive prior history of 
78. See generally INS Announces Second Cuban Migration Program, 73 INTERPRETER 
RELEASES 319 (1996); REFuoEE REP. No. 9, (Sept. 29, 1995); State Dept Implements Cuban 
Migration Agreement, 71 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1409 (1994); U.S., Cuba Reach Important 
Migration Agreement, 71 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1213, 1236-37 (1994). 
79. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration, Equality, and Diversity, 31 CoLUM. J. 
TRANSNATL. L. 319, 332-33 (1993) [hereinafter Legornsky, Diversity]. 
80. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
81. Challengers might argue that a disparate impact plus a showing of past discrimina-
tion, presumably in the form of past immigration laws, satisfy the "intent" requirement. Cf. 
Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1126-31 
(1989) (describing the court's acceptance of this method of proving intent in voting rights 
cases). 
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systematic discrimination against Haitians seeking to immigrate to 
this country."82 In fact, the government has never disputed that the 
interdiction policy is directed at Haitians. If this is unconstitutional, 
will any designation of particular countries for different treatment 
violate the Constitution? Finally, a more basic question: Should we 
treat racial or national origin discrimination challenges to immigra-
tion decisions as if they arose in a domestic, nonimmigration con-
text? Or are discrimination challenges in immigration cases 
different? 
Under current doctrine, courts tend to avoid rather than answer 
these questions. Before constitutional principles can play a mean-
ingful role in both shaping and sometimes limiting subconstitutional 
immigration law, courts must develop a sound approach to deciding 
when to intervene - and when to defer formally to the difficult 
choices that the political branches make in immigration law and 
policy. 
IV. Two MODELS OF CONSTITUTIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW 
Brimelow's own criticism of the 1965 Act provides a good start-
ing point to approach the issue of discrimination in immigration 
law. He argues that the Act treats "immigration as a sort of imita-
tion civil right, extended to an indefinite group of foreigners who 
have been selected arbitrarily and with no regard to American in-
terests. "83 Brimelow thus apparently assumes that immigrants 
come to the United States out of self-interest, that it is in the self-
interest of citizens to keep them out, and that if not for our mis-
guided altruism we could secure our borders and reduce, if not 
eliminate, net immigration. By casting immigration as a civil rights 
issue, Brimelow arrogates to himself - a recent British immigrant 
- the role of defending the American national interest. By the 
same rhetorical device, he casts anyone more favorable to immigra-
tion, especially in its present racial and ethnic mix, as placing immi-
grants' rights above the national interest. 
It is not surprising that Brimelow almost succeeds with this char-
acterization. Many of those who favor closer judicial scrutiny of the 
82. Brief of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Tran-
safrica, and the Congressional Black Caucus as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents 11, 
in Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 {1993) (No. 92-344); see also Haitian 
Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 451 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (concluding that the INS 
actions toward Haitians "constitute impermissible discrimination on the basis of national ori-
gin" but characterizing the racial basis for the policy as merely "a possible underlying rea-
son"), affd. on other grounds as modified sub nom. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 
1023 (5th Cir. 1982). But see Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973, 1001-02 (S.D. Fla. 1982) 
(finding that the plaintiffs had not shown intentional discrimination based on national ori· 
gin), affd. in part and revd. in part on other grounds en bane sub nom. Jean v. Nelson, 727 
F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984), affd. on other grounds, 472 U.S. 846 (1985). 
83. P. 5 (emphasis omitted); see also pp. 103-04, 242-43. 
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government's immigration decisions do, in fact, view immigration as 
an issue that involves the civil rights of immigrants. They see immi-
grants as human beings with rights that American law must recog-
nize,84 and this may be a fair reading of the common impetus 
behind the 1965 Immigration Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Under this "immigrants' rights" 
model, immigrants are the moral - and sometimes constitutional 
- equals of citizens. 
The history of the plenary power doctrine reveals two reasons 
for the link between the immigrants' rights model and closer consti-
tutional judicial review. First, courts that relied, on plenary power 
to uphold the government's immigration decisions typically did so 
by rejecting immigrants' claims that the government had violated 
their constitutional rights.87 Thus, in the traditional view, plenary 
power conflicts with immigrants' rights. Against this background, 
observers have interpreted recent erosion of the plenary power 
doctrine as a sign that aliens who were once constitutional "outsid-
ers" are slowly entering the constitutional fold and acquiring 
"rights. "86 
Second, plenary power entrusts the political branches with "im-
migration law" powers - to decide who can enter and remain in 
the United States. But immigration law makes up only part of the 
law that governs aliens' lives. An equally important yet distinct 
body of law - "alienage law" - governs their status after their 
arrival.87 It addresses, for example, whether aliens have access to 
public education, welfare benefits, government employment, or the 
ballot box. Aliens have fuller constitutional rights in these matters 
than in "immigration."88 As plenary power erodes, it is logical to 
assume that the recognition of aliens' constitutional rights in alien-
84. See, e.g., Sandra L. Jamison, Proposition 187: The United States May be Jeopardizing 
its International Treaty Obligations, 24 DENY. J. INTL. L. & PoLY. 229 (1995); Stephen Knight, 
Note, Proposition 187 and International Human Rights Law: Illegal Discrimination in the 
Right to Education, 19 HAST. INTI.. & CoMP. L. REv. 183 (1995); cf. Stephen A. Plass, The 
Foreign Amici Dilemma, 1995 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1189, 1211-15 {discussing a foreign amicus 
brief filed in support of Haitian asylum seekers). 
85. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-91 {1952); Fong Yue Ting v. 
United States, 149 U.S. 698 {1893). 
86. See, e.g., Legomsky, Diversity, supra note 79, at 335 (urging us to see immigrants as 
"individual human beings, to be judged according to their individual needs and merits"); 
Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 965, 970-71 
(noting that the traditional sovereignty-based plenary power doctrine was based on the now 
disfavored view that "persons were objects, not subjects, in international law") (emphasis 
omitted). 
87. On the elusive distinction between immigration law and alienage law, see Linda S. 
Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference That Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1047 (1994); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, Federalism and Proposition 187, 
35 VA. J. INTL. L. 201, 203 {1994) [hereinafter Motomura, Immigration and Alienage]. 
88. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 
(1971). The tradition to which these decisions belong began with Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 
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age law fosters the recognition of "immigrants' rights" in immigra-
tion law. 
This plenary power versus immigrants' rights construct oversim-
plifies constitutional immigration law. Immigration law - espe-
cially the 1965 Act's repeal of the national origins system -
certainly implicates civil rights. But whose civil rights? Those of 
the immigrants who want to come to the United States? Or those 
of the Americans who have family, employment, racial, or ethnic 
ties to them? 
Peter Brimelow and I do have one thing in common -the belief 
that immigration policy must serve the national interest. Viewed 
from that perspective, the immigrants' rights model raises difficult 
questions. Is every human being a member of our constitutional 
community? If not, how do we set limits? If we can answer these 
questions, the immigrants' rights model can help to guide the devel-
opment of constitutional immigration law. However, because the 
immigrants' rights model fails to capture the domestic effects of im-
migration policy, it can only help. Constitutional immigration law 
also requires a model that can capture those domestic effects. 
In addition to an immigrants' rights model that focuses on immi-
grants' constitutional rights, I suggest a national self-definition 
model that focuses on the rights of those who are already members 
of the constitutional community.89 Citizens are full members. 
Noncitizen immigrants are not - but they are still members in two 
important ways. First, alienage is transitional; immigrants must 
have access to full membership through the legal process of natural-
ization as citizens and through social processes of integration.9° 
Second, they must be allowed to participate - though not neces-
sarily to the same degree as full members - in choosing new 
members.91 
Members select new members and thus decide who "we" are as 
Americans. This is a project of national self-definition.92 It in-
U.S. 356 (1886). See Motomura, Phantom Norms, supra note 69, at 565-67, 583-87; 
Motomura, Procedural Surrogates, supra note 71, at 1647-48, 1688-92. 
89. For a similar suggestion that we focus on "citizens' rights," see Frank H. Wu, The 
Limits of Borders: A Moderate Proposal for Immigration Reform, STAN. L. & POLY. REV. 
(forthcoming 1996) (manuscript on file with author). 
90. See Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, supra note 87, at 212. 
91. My definition of member is not crucial to the national self-definition model that I 
propose. One might define member more broadly (for example, to include undocumented 
aliens) or narrowly (for example, to exclude permanent residents) and still accept the notion 
that participation in the selection of new members is a right of membership. See generally T. 
Alexander Aleinikoff, The Tightening Circle of Membership, 22 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 915 
(1995). 
92. Here I build on Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, supra note 87, at 203; 
Motomura, Procedural Surrogates, supra note 71, at 1704. Readers will discern my debt to 
MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 35-42 (1983), and BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL 
JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 89-95 (1980). 
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eludes not only deciding whom to admit and expel, but also provid-
ing for each alien's transition from outsider to citizen. This national 
self-definition model concerns itself more with how immigration de-
cisions affect those who already belong than with how they affect 
those who want to join. Under this model, immigration decisions 
have domestic consequences f 01; members and, therefore, those de-
cisions must at least potentially undergo constitutional judicial 
review. 
The real question is not whether immigration is "necessary," as 
Brimelow puts it (pp.157-59, 164-68), but whether we are better off 
because of immigration. To answer this, we need to think about 
who "we" are. The national self-definition model tells us what is 
wrong with Brimelow's picture of America being invaded by 
colored hordes. Contrary to this image, the arrival of immigrants, 
regardless of their race, benefits a great many of us. And a great 
many of us welcome immigrants of color. While one critic of Alien 
Nation calls it "an unapologetic attempt to restore the good name 
of nativism,"93 Brimelow does not speak for all of the "natives." 
While some natives - mostly of Anglo-Saxon and other European 
origins - may share his views, many "natives" of more suspect ori-
gins probably do not.94 Those who fear "they" will overwhelm "us" 
naively and invidiously ignore those of "us" who not only welcome 
"them" but also see "them" as vital to our national self-interest. 
How would a national self-definition model foster the develop-
ment of constitutional immigration law? The following discussion, 
though far short of exhaustive, suggests an agenqa for research and 
thought. 
A. Federalism 
The national self-definition model affects how we think about 
the federal-state allocation of power in immigration and alienage 
matters.9s In the immigrants' rights model, the strongest justifica-
tion for federal preeminence is the "special concern about state, as 
opposed to federal, propensities to oppress aliens."96 The national 
self-definition model suggests a different, and probably comple-
93. Philip Kasinitz, Closing the Gates, NEWSDAY, (Apr. 23, 1995), at 32 (reviewing Alien 
Nation). 
94. "I'd like to say a word for the nativists." P. 12. For a perceptive analysis of the 
concept of "nativism,'' including Brimelow's use of the term, see Linda S. Bosniak, "Nativ-
ism" the Concept: Some Reflections, in IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE 
ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES (Juan Perea ed., forthcoming 1996) (man-
uscript on file with author). 
95. For more on this aspect of the national self-definition model, see Motomura, Immi-
gration and Alienage, supra note 87, at 206-11, 214-16. 
96. Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens As Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition 187, and 
the Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REv. 1425, 1436 (1995). 
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mentary, justification for federal preeminence. In part, this justifi-
cation is self-evident: In a national self-definition project, the 
federal government can offer justifications for immigration and 
alienage decisions that a state could not.97 
As we look more closely at national self-definition, a very real 
danger emerges that states will adopt different and conflicting re-
sponses. Brimelow notes that the effects of immigration vary re-
gionally. He argues that whites are fleeing the coasts to seek refuge 
in a "white heartland" in the mountain states (p. 69). If this is true 
- Brimelow offers no supporting data - and it is a problem, it 
demands a national solution, not a variety of separate state initia-
tives. State efforts to strengthen enforcement of federal immigra-
tion laws - including Proposition 187 - elevate the sense of state 
rather than national citizenship, and thereby undermine the "na-
tion" Brimelow purports to protect.98 
B. Members' Rights 
The national self-definition model suggests that the answers to 
constitutional immigration law questions should depend on how im-
migration policy affects members.99 It brings legal discourse, which 
currently focuses on whether or not immigrants have constitutional 
rights, more into line with political discourse, which currently fo-
cuses on immigration's effects on racial and ethnic communities and 
on American society generally. A shared judicial and political con-
cern with members' rights would open a more fruitful dialogue be-
tween the judiciary and the political branches. 
Thus far, the Supreme Court has refused - consistent with the 
plenary power doctrine - to entertain claims that immigration de-
cisions infringe on citizens' constitutional rights. For example, in 
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 100 the Supreme Court rejected the argument 
that the ideologically based exclusion of a Marxist violated the First 
Amendment rights of the citizens who invited him to visit universi-
ties in this country. Similarly, in Fiallo v. Bel/1°1 the Supreme Court 
rejected an equal protection challenge to an immigration statute 
that granted mothers, but not fathers, the chance to obtain immi-
grant visas for their children born out of wedlock. 
97. If national self-definition is a uniquely federal enterprise, federalism in immigration 
matters may be quite different from federalism generally. 
98. While Brimelow seems to endorse restrictionist state measures such as California's 
Proposition 187 (pp. 259-62, 263), I suspect that he would prefer federal laws that would 
accomplish the same goals nationwide. 
99. Although Brimelow sometimes seems to see that citizens' rights are at stake, he read-
ily dismisses them. See pp. 105-06, 119-20. 
100. 408 U.S. 753, 765-70 {1972). 
101. 430 U.S. 787 {1977). 
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Although Mandel and Fiallo rejected the citizens' rights argu-
ment out of hand,102 plaintiffs in immigration cases continue to cast 
their constitutional challenges in these terms. For example, several 
plaintiffs have challenged the government's restrictions on Haitian 
asylum seekers' access to volunteer legal counsel.103 These citizen 
plaintiffs relied on their First Amendment right to provide counsel, 
not on the aliens' Fifth Amendment right to receive it.104 Yet, 
judges and even the plaintiffs themselves seem to view the citizens' 
rights argument as a litigation tactic to curtail plenary power and 
not as an analytical construct that might, in time, provide a coher-
ent alternative to an immigrants' rights model. 
1. Limiting the Right to Choose New Members 
In the context of race and ethnicity, the national self-definition 
model recognizes that immigration law implicates the members' 
rights to choose new members. Since any new Americans will par-
ticipate in and shape American society and politics, the act of 
choosing them is central to a citizen's right to participate in this 
national self-definition project. In this sense, choosing new mem-
bers is akin to choosing representatives in the political process. Ac-
cordingly, it may be a fundamental right for purposes of equal 
protection analysis, akin to the right to vote. 
An immigration law that chooses immigrants by race or ethnic-
ity limits - in ways that raise serious constitutional questions -
the members' right to choose new members. Most significantly, an 
immigration law that excludes members of a particular race or eth-
nic group may cast a stigma on that group.105 Unless the govern-
ment can show a compelling interest, any such provable stigma 
violates the bedrock equal protection prohibition against treating 
any person as inferior to another by virtue of race or ethnicity.106 
102. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 767-69; Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 794-95. 
103. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 113 S. a. 2549 (1993); Haitian Refu-
gee Center v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1122 (1992). 
104. See also Ukrainian-American Bar Assn. v. Baker, 893 F.2d 1374 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 
(discussing the claim by the Ukranian-American Bar Association that the government vio-
lated its First Amendment right to associate by refusing to infonn aliens of its offer to free 
legal counsel); cf. Ben-Issa v. Reagan, 645 F. Supp. 1556, 1562 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (finding 
that a citizen's constitutional rights were not implicated by the denial of visa to her alien 
husband). For a more favorable response to this sort of argument, see Manwani v. United 
States Dept. of Justice, 736 F. Supp. 1367, 1379-82 (W.D.N.C. 1990). 
105. Cf. Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated General Contractors v. Jackson-
ville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993) (noting that, in equal protection cases, injury in fact "is the 
denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate inabil-
ity to obtain the benefit"). 
106. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. a. 2816, 2824 (1993) (asserting that racial classifica-
tions "threaten to stigmatize individuals by reason of their membership in a racial group and 
to incite racial hostility"); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (asserting 
that racially segregated schools convey to blacks "a feeling of inferiority as to their status in 
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In this vein, Professor Louis Jaffe criticized the retention of the 
national origins system in 1952 by writing: "Its quota provisions ... 
give needless offense to many of our citizens and to the people of 
other countries."107 A generation later but in like manner, Profes-
sor Gerald Rosberg argued that immigration decisions may stigma-
tize citizens. He wrote: "When Congress declares that aliens of 
Chinese or Irish or Polish origin are excludable on the grounds of 
ancestry alone, it fixes a badge of opprobrium on citizens of the 
same ancestry."108 Thus, he said, "Congress cannot implement a. 
policy that has the effect of labeling some group of citizens as inf er-
ior to others because of their race or national origin. "109 
By this reasoning, a national self-definition model may mean 
that the judicial scrutiny of some immigration decisions should be 
as close as the judicial scrutiny of alienage questions. This outcome 
seems counterintuitive, because the plenary power doctrine has his-
torically meant less constitutional judicial review in immigration 
cases than in alienage cases. But equally close review may indeed 
be appropriate in immigration decisions that infringe on citizens' 
rights. Choosing the immigrants who may enter in the first place is 
as important to national self-definition as deciding what rights those 
immigrants will have after they enter. Stigmatizing citizens by ex-
cluding immigrants of like ancestry poses as many constitutional 
difficulties as alienage discrimination.110 
2. ·The Redistricting Analogy 
When an immigration policy relies on racial or ethnic distinc-
tions, more than stigma is at stake. The policy may extinguish or 
stunt the growth of a racial or ethnic community. It may also se-
the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone"). 
For an illuminating discussion of stigma as a constitutional concept, see Jerry Kang, Negative 
Action Against Asian-Americans: The Internal Instability of Dworkin's Defense of Affirma-
tive Action, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 21-36 (1996). 
107. Louis L. Jaffe, The Philosophy of Our Immigration Law, 21 LAW & CoNTEMP. 
PROBS. 358, 358 (1956). . 
108. Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by the 
National Government, 1977 SuP. CT. REv. 275, 327. 
109. Id. See also id. at 326 ("[A] classification that distinguishes among citizens on 
grounds that are disfavored or suspect must receive special scrutiny. Thus, if Congress were 
to decree that white citizens can confer an immigration preference on their alien relatives but 
black citizens cannot, one can hardly believe that the Court would uphold the 
classification."). 
110. As Professor Rosberg notes: 
Many aliens are indistinguishable from citizens, and discrimination against them may 
involve little stigma. By contrast, discrimination against the foreign-born or against per-
sons perceived as foreign because of their ethnic or racial background will inevitably 
produce much greater stigma. But at this point one has moved from discrimination on 
the grounds of alienage to discrimination on the grounds of race or national origin, and 
there strict scrutiny is obviously required. 
Id. at 304. 
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verely limit a community's ability to participate meaningfully in 
public processes and to work toward its vision of the American 
future.111 
The national self-definition model suggests that immigration 
and redistricting have more in common with each other than with 
other areas of constitutional law. Both involve threshold determi-
nations of membership. Immigration law decides membership di-
rectly, and redistricting law determines the political effects of 
membership. In short, both construct a political reality. 
Legal schemes also govern immigration and voting in similar 
ways. While the constitutionally sensitive factors of race and 
ethnicity lie at the heart of both processes, these processes share a 
polycentric complexity that has made courts wary of seriously re-
viewing them. Much of the complexity lies in the elusiveness of any 
baseline for finding violations.112 What, for example, is a "normal" 
number of Irish or Haitians to be admitted to the United States? 
Consider, then, how Professor Rosberg's comment on immigra-
tion law also applies to redistricting: 
The formulation of an immigration policy requires the drawing of an 
extraordinary number of lines, many of them necessarily arbitrary .... 
The Court is undoubtedly fearful of becoming enmeshed in the pro-
cess of formulating immigration policy. Too much judicial scrutiny 
could bring down the entire system of intricate and interconnected 
rules, reducing it all to a shambles.113 
In tum, consider how the following comment on redistricting from 
the .Supreme Court would also apply to immigration policy: 
Redistricting legislatures will . . . almost always be aware of racial 
demographics; but it does not follow that race predominates in the 
redistricting process .... The distinction between being aware of racial 
considerations and being motivated by them may be difficult to make. 
This evidentiary difficulty, together with the sensitive nature of redis-
tricting and the presumption of good faith that must be accorded leg-
islative enactments, requires courts to exercise extraordinary caution 
in adjudicating claims that a state has drawn district lines on the basis 
of race.114 
111. See generally HING, supra note 35, at 190. ("Immigration and refugee policies have 
influenced gender ratios, where people live, how people live, the jobs they have, their in-
come, as well as personal identity."). 
112. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing 
Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 620 (1993) ("Unlike employ-
ment decisions or academic admissions, redistricting does not readily admit a neutral baseline 
against which 'bizarrely' shaped districts can be measured."). 
113. Rosberg, supra note 108, at 324-25; cf. City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 126 
(1981) (upholding a street closure allegedly intended to separate a predominantly black 
neighborhood from a predominantly white one; "[p]roper management of the flow of vehicu-
lar traffic within a city requires the accommodation of a variety of conflicting interests"). 
114. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2488 (1995). 
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Drafters of redistricting plans know the racial composition of the 
districts they create, just as those who make immigration law know 
the race or ethnicity of those they admit or exclude. 
Both redistricting and immigration law require some essential-
ism - the attribution of political or cultural character to individu-
als based on race or ethnicity. After all, redistricting and 
immigration involve decisions about groups, not individuals. Essen-
tialism would seem to violate the constitutional principle that gov-
ernment may not treat individuals "as simply components of a 
racial, religious, sexual or national class."115 Under the national 
self-definition model of immigration law, however, the essentialism 
objection is less persuasive; any essentialism would focus on would-
be immigrants, not citizens. 
In both immigration and redistricting, race-conscious decision-
making is more constitutionally palatable when it helps groups that 
have suffered past discrimination. However, the U.S. immigration 
policy toward Haiti may harm a historically disadvantaged group -
namely, black Americans. In contrast, when Congress adopted the 
precursor of the current "diversity visa" program in 1986, many of 
its supporters sought to increase the number of European immi-
grants, especially Irish, who had been favored in U.S. immigration 
law until 1965.116 Indeed, for each of several years the program set 
aside 16,000 out of 40,000 visas for Irish nationals.117 Under the 
current version of the program, immigrant visas are distributed 
through an annual lottery, which only nationals of "low admission" 
countries may enter.HS 
v. THE NATIONAL SELF-DEFINITION PROJECT 
Constitutional immigration law must acknowledge that immi-
gration policy shapes racial and ethnic communities. The national 
115. 115 S. Ct. at 2486 (quoting Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting)). 
116. See Act of Nov. 29, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 132, 104 Stat. 4978, 5000; Act of 
Nov. 15, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-658, § 3, 102 Stat. 3908, 3908-09; Immigration and Reform 
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 314, 100 Stat. 3359, 3439. On the desire to restore Euro-
pean, and particularly Irish, immigration, see 136 CoNG. REC. E3118 (1990) (remarks of Rep. 
Donnelly); Reform of Legal Immigration: Hearings on H.R. 5115 and S. 2I04 Before the 
Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 269, 542 (1988) (statements of Thomas J. Flatley and Donald 
Martin); H.R. REP. 100-1038, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); see also Irish-Americans Praise 
New Immigration Bil~ N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1990, at 47. 
117. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 132{c), 104 Stat. 4978, 5000 
{allocating at least 40% of the diversity visas to nationals of the foreign state that received 
the most visas under the previous version of the diversity visa program). 
118. See generally THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN, & HIROSHI 
MoTOMURA, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND PouCY 129-31 {3d ed. 1995); Legomsky, Diver-
sity, supra note 79, at 329-33. See also 61 FED. REG. 2862, 2862-63 (1996) (registration notice 
for Diversity Immigrant Visa Program). 
May 1996] Immigration 1951 
self-definition model rightly shifts the focus away from the Haitians 
and Irish who want to immigrate to the Haitian-American and 
Irish-American citizens and permanent residents who already live 
here. This shift admittedly prefers members over those who want 
to join. Yet, this shift seems vital. National cohesion requires that 
Americans have faith that they have a role in choosing new 
Americans. 
Brimelow contends that "multiculturalism" undermines the al-
ready difficult integration of immigrants. He views integration in 
racial or ethnic terms, and he believes that nonwhite immigration 
decreases national cohesion because nonwhites "assimilate" poorly 
(pp. 269-74). It is true that a society risks serious divisions if it ad-
mits immigrants without integrating them. In fact, many immi-
grants are skeptical of "multiculturalism" because they see it as a 
way to keep them distant and disenfranchised. Moreover, the inte-
gration of immigrants into the receiving society is a much more 
complex process than Brimelow acknowledges. Admission only be-
gins the integration process. The bundle of rights that immigrants 
enjoy as they make the transition to citizenship is just as crucial, 
and while only the first generation of immigrants catches 
Brimelow's eye, the integration process takes longer. 
Brimelow's solution to the national cohesion problem - to use 
immigration policy to make America more white - will splinter 
America like nothing else. If we admit or exclude immigrants on 
the basis of race, we are more likely to tolerate racial distinctions in 
the transition to citizenship and to tolerate the divided society that 
will result. While Brimelow rails against multiculturalism, his pro-
posals foster a different kind of multiculturalism - white 
separatism.119 
The national self-definition model will not necessarily insulate 
racial and ethnic groups from dilution over time. The effects of ju-
dicial review will vary. Often, I suspect, judicial review will leave 
intact the immigration decisions of the political branches, because 
judges will find no workable standards to guide their intervention. 
For example, persuasive proof of invidious race-based intent is 
often difficult to present in constitutional litigation.120 Inquiries 
into legislative intent become especially complex when immigration 
law is written in nonracial language that has a disproportionate im-
pact by race or ethnicity.121 History shows us how immigration stat-
119. See p. 124 ("[T]he evidence that multiracial societies work is - what shall we say? 
- not very encouraging."). 
120. See the discussion of the "intent" requirement supra notes 80-81. 
121. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, Popular Democ-
racy, and California's Proposition 187: The Political Relevance and Legal Irrelevance of Race, 
70 WASH. L. REV. 629 (1995) (noting the difficulties in proving a discriminatory intent of the 
drafters of California Proposition 187). The limits of an intent-based equal protection doc-
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utes can be drafted neutrally when the drafters intended to 
discriminate. For example, the 1924 Act barred Japanese immi-
grants through the apparently neutral exclusion of "aliens ineligible 
to citizenship."122 Likewise, the diversity visa statute - though 
drafted in neutral terms123 - was intended to increase the number 
of European immigrants.124 Courts will need time to find workable 
approaches to the intent question in the immigration context, much 
as they currently struggle with it in the redistricting context. 
Whether or not we need more judicial intervention, we do need 
a serious and comprehensive discussion about when it should occur. 
To propel that discussion, courts should add to the nascent body of 
constitutional immigration law by introducing a national self-
definition model that focuses on the rights of citizens and perma-
nent residents. This model, as it happens, will expose the constitu-
tional flaws in Brimelow's proposals far more effectively than an 
immigrants' rights model can. And a national self-definition model 
will allow courts to begin a long overdue dialogue with the political 
branches on matters of race and ethnicity in immigration policy. 
trine seem particularly evident in the immigration field. See generally Charles R. Lawrence 
III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. 
REv. 317 (1987). 
122. See supra note 34. 
123. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 203(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c). 
124. See sources cited supra note 116; cf. Wu, supra note 89 (discussing the proposed 
application of constitutional limits to immigration laws that in operation focus on race as 
opposed to alienage); Jan C. Ting, "Other Than a Chinaman": How U.S. Immigration Law 
Resulted From and Still Reflects a Policy of Excluding and Restricting Asian Immigration, 4 
TEMPLE Par.. & CIV. Rrs. L. REv. 301, 301 (1995) (discussing "the last vestiges of race-biased 
immigration law and practice"). 
